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The threats arising from the norm of hyper-interconnection are couched in a myriad of often confusing and overlapping terms and frames of reference. 
These range from those employed by the 
private sector, often referred to as cyber 
security to combat cyber crime, to cyber-
warfare for the military to protect national 
interests, and then cyber terrorism 
(referred to hereafter as cyber insurgency) 
that demands everyone’s attention but is 
perhaps not everyone’s responsibility.
Given that these three distinctions—
crime, warfare and insurgency—are 
crudely drawn (in part as a result of the 
structures of government and commerce), 
to complicate things further, they differ 
by Dr. Tom Smith
With perhaps the exception of infectious disease, no other security 
challenge is perhaps as pervasive and universal as those proliferating 
from cyberspace. Every nation in the Asia-Pacific region, not least the 
world, is connected to the World Wide Web; yes even the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
drastically from nation to nation for many 
different reasons. What is understood as 
a cyber crime in one domain can be con-
sidered cyber insurgency in the next. Poli-
tics and economics are obvious drivers of 
these distinctions but culture and techno-
logical literacy is also a key force that can 
partly level otherwise unbalanced ideo-
logical or financial playing fields. 
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This is a topic as complex as it is 
compelling. Indeed because this topic is 
confusing, this is one of the reasons why 
such threats exist in the cyber domain. 
The language of this problem is in itself 
something we often have to learn from 
scratch and continually renew. This is not 
an arena where classical Clausewitzian 
military thinking readily lends itself to 
debates regarding the malicious use of 
computer software and such like, though 
we would do well to apply all the mod-
els we can to the problems before us. So 
while trying to divide the cyber problem 
up by way of national and polity bound-
aries, as is the regular response to most 
security concerns, often the response is a 
clumsy attempt to make a national solu-
tion out of a very international problem. 
Nations understandably are concerned 
about their cyber domain, but because 
their cyber domain is unable to be fenced 
off and patrolled, this presents a ques-
tion of what are they trying to protect? 
Each nation is asking the same question 
of itself.  Each shares the other’s concerns 
and vulnerabilities, and the response has 
largely been to retreat and guard our own 
‘digital turf’ in the best way we can. 
Cyber-Crime
Seemingly some countries have more to 
lose than others, the valuable financial 
assets of developed nations heighten 
concern for these states. So when west-
ern companies cry foul over the cyber 
criminals stealing Intellectual Property 
(IP) from manufacturers, designers and 
other creatives in the sacred knowledge 
economy, Western governments act with 
the cyber crime units of national police 
organisations and alike. Though to what 
extent the US Department for Homeland 
Security can help Google in this regard is 
a question worth asking. 
In 2015 a report published by Price-
waterhouseCoopers, a British professional 
services company, for the UK govern-
ment found the average cost of the worst 
cyber breaches at large UK organisations 
to be between $2 million and $3.1 million; 
eye watering amounts for single breaches. 
But the concern is shared in all nations; 
when internet access is the 21st century 
golden ticket to economic prosperity, de-
veloping nations need the same protec-
tion. This is therefore not an East versus 
West, North versus South or rich versus 
poor problem yet it is often implied that 
way. The poor may steal from the rich, 
but there are some awfully rich cyber 
criminals stealing from the poorest in the 
world. Then there are social crusaders 
such as the Algerian hacker Hamza Ben-
delladji who was arrested in Bangkok in 
2013 and is, at the time of writing (April), 
currently being sentenced in a US court 
for the use of a malware (malicious soft-
ware) programme called Zeus for stealing 
from US banks and giving the money to 
Palestinian charities.
From the inception of the networked 
computer and later the growth of the 
World Wide Web in the 1990s, crime like 
other human behaviours has both exploit-
ed and fuelled the need to interconnect. In 
the same way that crime Away From the 
Keyboard (AFK) or In Real Life (IRL) ben-
efits from improved communication there 
is little surprise that the digital realm has 
become a domain and producer of new 
criminal enterprise. Data, the series of 
binary zeros and ones hidden inside a 
programming language, is the new trea-
sure. This data is valuable outside of its 
hard drive, and beyond its user and in-
tended purpose. Therefore, the desire for 
this new and increasingly valuable com-
modity is not just the new gold rush but 
perhaps the only gold rush in 21st century 
life, Bitcoin (an online virtual currency) 
included. Data is digital and however 
sophistically encrypted, is now nearly 
always accessible remotely: It is the out-
post that can allow the criminal to tunnel 
straight to the main camp. 
Given that the natural hub of analogue 
organised crime did not initially possess 
the skills to make the shift from IRL crime 
to cyber crime, the lone hacker had much 
of the digital landscape to themselves for a 
The Anonymous organisation has attacked many organisations, governments and corporations 










The US military has deepened its interest 
in the cyber domain, forming units 
and commands specifically tasked with 
protecting and exploiting the cyber domain 
from cyber warfare.
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short period. Today, organised crime very 
much does. With cyber crime the IRL dis-
tinction has blurred if not disappeared en-
tirely. In the Asia-Pacific, the historic and 
well entrenched organised crime networks 
of the Solntsevskaya Bratva (Russian Mafia), 
various  groups of the Chinese Mafia (Tri-
ads) such as the Sun Yee On and Japan’s 
Yamaguchi Gumi (Yakuza) have shown the 
same criminal enterprise as they have in 
interests as varied as drug trafficking and 
sports betting. In August 2015 Jakarta Po-
lice crime directorate head Senior Com-
mander Krishna Murti was explicit in 
his blame for transnational cyber crime 
undertaken in his domain. “The victims 
are mostly from the People’s Republic of 
China and Taiwan. The network itself (is) 
protected by big (criminal) organizations 
in Japan such as the Yakuza,” he said. 
Criminal enterprise changes over 
time as our behaviours change online, 
from credit card theft, to more sophisti-
cated bribery and extortion often based 
on hacking email, social media and other 
accounts. The range of threat and target 
is wide, from individuals to companies, 
from financial data to sensitive personal 
from weaker technical infrastructures 
and the lack of a culture of strong cyber 
security. Western companies were obvi-
ous first targets for the first generation 
of cyber criminals, but as their defences 
improve in response, vulnerabilities in 
growing Asia-Pacific markets is seen as 
a potentially softer target and no less 
profitable anymore. Indeed the lack of a 
Europol-style multinational law enforce-
ment organisation in the Asia-Pacific 
equipped with cyber expertise is telling.
Cyber War
Where nations clash, the cyber domain 
like all others, is another arena for conflict 
for the 21st century. The first thing to note 
is that ‘war’ is something that is usually 
done in the open. What is being termed 
‘cyber war’ has been fought largely be-
hind closed doors and is really not war in 
any term we could conflate with notions 
of traditional warfare. Can countries be 
our enemies in cyberspace but our allies 
in all other spaces?
What do nations understand as an act 
of cyber war? This also remains unclear. 
The hacking of commercial data that 
data. Some tactics require only an in-
dependent programme others human 
interaction, some work with both. The 
DDB4C (Distributed Denial of Service for 
Bitcoins) group responsible for a string 
of attacks around the globe has required 
an 18-month campaign headed by Eu-
ropol (the law enforcement agency of the 
European Union) to make arrests in 2016 
following perhaps the most sophisticated 
extortion campaign yet seen.
The response globally and specifically 
in the Asia-Pacific has largely been the fo-
cus of the cyber security sector for individ-
uals and companies to manage, usually by 
outsourcing to experts. The growth of the 
cyber security industry to protect online 
identities, encrypt the embarrassing fam-
ily photos or the latest company design 
is inherently commercial. As the value of 
commoditized data rises seemingly inexo-
rably there is a cost, a financial one, to our 
digital life and our digital trade. This cre-
ates a burden particularly painful to those 
without basic literacy in cyber security and 
for start-up enterprises in developing na-
tions that require support. Even small en-
terprises in developing nations will suffer 
The pan-European law enforcement 
organisation Europol is playing a significant 
role in combating the activities of cyber crime, 
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leads to commercial losses on a large scale 
could certainly damage economic nation-
al interest and potentially be grounds for 
a national military response. Similarly a 
smaller scale sensitive theft from defence 
contractors could strike at the heart of a 
nation’s security. But is this not old fash-
ioned espionage made digital? Cyber war 
remains a phrase banded about but with 
little application. 
Cyber war between states as well as 
between the many non-state actors active 
in the cyber domain raises more ques-
tions than answers. Are those fighting 
cyber war concerned about cyber crime? 
Is the commercial threat something which 
militaries in the Asia-Pacific are cognizant 
of? If so, at what point do these attacks 
become war? And this is all before we get 
to the other half of the issue, namely how 
do we fight back? With cyber? Can this 
avoid civilian casualties? With conven-
tional force? Is that proportionate? These, 
and many other questions, have lead to 
increasing amounts of scepticism in the 
cyber community about what is said and 
meant to be cyber warfare.
Evgeny Morozov, who studies the po-
litical and social implications of technol-
ogy, and author of To Save Everything Click 
Here and The Net Delusion, has described 
how the debate on cyber war is “packed 
with cyber-jingoism from former and cur-
rent national security officials.” But when 
people like the Director of the Central In-
telligence Agency Leon Panetta claim that 
“the next Pearl Harbour is likely to be a 
cyber attack going after our grid” people 
take notice.  The noted commercial inter-
ests in cyber crime are also found in cyber 
warfare with a number of government 
contractors providing expertise to mili-
taries which have lead to accusations of 
threat inflation. To Mr. Morozov “cyber-
war is the new ‘dog ate my homework’ 
(excuse). It’s far easier to blame every-
thing on mysterious Chinese hackers than 
to embark on uncomfortable institutional 
soul-searching.”
For its part the White House under 
President Barack Obama has tried to bring 
clarity. “America’s economic prosperity, 
national security, and our individual liber-
ties depend on our commitment to secur-
ing cyberspace and maintaining an open, 
interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet. 
Our critical infrastructure continues to be 
at risk from threats in cyberspace, and our 
economy is harmed by the theft of our in-
tellectual property. Although the threats 
are serious and they constantly evolve, I 
believe that if we address them effectively, 
we can ensure that the Internet remains an 
engine for economic growth and a plat-
form for the free exchange of ideas,” Mr. 
Obama stated in 2014.
The PRC’s response has been equally 
measured. Xi Jinping, the PRC’s Presi-
dent during a September 2015 visit to 
the White House agreed stating that 
“commercial cyber theft against govern-
ment networks are crimes that must be 
punished in relevance to international 
treaties.” Mr. Xi added that “(t)he inter-
national community should work to en-
sure a peaceful and open cyber security 
space.” Agreement between the US and 
the PRC on implementation and making 
any of the common ground into reality 
has yet to surface. Is it in a nation’s inter-
est to remove the tool of cyber warfare 
from their arsenal? For now it seems 
not, and the risk of cyber turning ki-
netic, physical or IRL (however we wish 
to disguise it) has been made very clear. 
“When warranted, the United States will 
respond to hostile acts in cyberspace 
as we would to any other threat to our 
country,” noted the US International 
Strategy for Cyberspace in 2011. “We 
reserve the right to use all necessary 
means, diplomatic, informational, mili-
tary, and economic, as appropriate and 
consistent with applicable international 
law, in order to defend our nation, our 
allies, our partners, and our interests. In 
so doing, we will exhaust all options be-
fore military force whenever we can; will 
carefully weigh the costs and risks of 
action against the costs of inaction; and 
will act in a way that reflects our values 
and strengthens our legitimacy, seeking 
broad international support whenever 
possible,” the strategy continued.
Cyber Insurgency
Somewhere between the previous two 
subsets of ‘the cyber problem’ is an-
other popular used and abused term, 
‘cyber-terrorism’. As a general rule AMR, 
prefers to avoid the term ‘terrorist’ or 
‘terrorism’ which we believe has the po-
tential to be value-laden. However, for 
the sake of clarity, we will take the non-
state actor as the cyber insurgent, but 
under the proviso that states (and crimi-
nals for that matter) are perfectly capable 
of using insurgency as a tactic. Groups 
or individuals using many of the same 
cyber vulnerabilities exploited in crime 
and potentially in warfare are capable of 
committing the same attacks but for dif-
ferent reasons. Financial gain, economic 
superiority or technological advantage 
can be replaced by politics, ideology, re-
ligion and the myriad of motivations for 
insurgent actions.
When the Stuxnet computer worm 
(widely believed to have been developed 
by US and Israeli computer experts) hit 
the Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz, 
central Iran in 2010, the obvious repercus-
sions caused seismic waves throughout 
the international security community. 
Stuxnet was designed to infect and alter 
computer-controlled electro-mechanical 
processes. There is obvious motivation 
for such acts to be carried out by other 
states wishing to hinder Iranian nuclear 
proliferation, but the warning that such 
acts are possible raised the stakes of such 
an act for non-state actors with technical 
expertise and motivation. 
The other sphere when it comes to cy-
ber insurgency is when ‘traditional’ IRL 
terrorist groups use the cyber domain to 
their advantage. Much has been made of 
the blatant use of web technologies by the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in-
surgent group, be it through social media 
and the dark web for propaganda net-
working but also in the adoption of en-
crypted messaging. For now these have 
been framed in a way as to support the 
IRL activates, to generate revenue, sup-
port and foreign fighters for physical con-
flict in Syria and elsewhere.
Across the Asia-Pacific, despite 
regional cooperation by the likes of 
ASEAN (the Association of South East 
Asian Nations), there are considerable 
rivalries that for now prevent the regional 
collaboration on enforcement that you see 
in Europe or even the dialogue pursued by 
competing nations such as the US and PRC 
as noted above. The old, and somewhat true, 
adage that ‘Free Trade Stops Wars’ could 
be revised here as a principle to deter 
cyber war. This could be done if cyber 
cooperation is understood as the founda-
tion on which trade and ultimately peace 
is based upon. AMR
ISIS has been adept at using the Internet both 
for the performance of cyberattacks, but also 
for propaganda purposes and as a powerful 
recruitment tool.
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